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LiberalizationEfforts
Prior to 1966
Aswe pointed out in the preceding chapter, the Indian economy may be char-
acterized as going through Phase II during the 1962—66 period. Export sub-
sidization was steadily and energetically undertaken to reduce the degree and
the consequences of the overvaluation of the exchange rate. In addition, the
period was characterized by a steady attempt at unifying the import duties
which had been increasingly deployed to mop up the import premia on the
QR-regime-administered allocations of foreign exchange, and by attempts at
streamlining the industrial licensing system so as to reduce, though not to
eliminate (in the nature of the case) its adverse effects on efficiency and dis-
tributive justice. In many ways, and not just in the matter of export subsidiza-
tion, this period was one of growing attempts to reduce the adverse impact
of Phase I-type policies. Thus, we could well describe our Phase II as a period
of partial and halting efforts at liberalization, as contrasted with the preceding
period, 1956—6 1, which witnessed the imposition and consolidation of the
QR-regime.
In this chapter, before we proceed to discuss the June 1966 devaluation
which constitutes our liberalization episode, and which we analyze intensively
throughout Part III of this study, we note the major aspects of these other
reforms at removing the worst aspects of the Phase I regime.
INCREASING USE OF TARIFFS
From 1962—63 onward, import duties were used with increasing frequency






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.78 THE ANATOMY OF EXCHANGE CONTROL
summarizes this trend, showing that the average import duty (collected on
dutiable imports) rose steadily up to the devaluation when, concurrently
with the parity change, many duties were revised downward.2
The vast majority of these tariff increases were selective and differential,
although some reliance was placed on across-the-board increases in duties
later in the period. In 1962—63, for example, import duties were raised on
some iron and steel items, silk yarn, copra, cars and machine tools. In 1963—64
the budget was used to raise import duties further on machinery, raw cotton,
rubber, palm oil, iron and steel manufactures, mineral oils and dyes, among
other commodities.
Beginning with the 1963—64 budget, however, the principle of across-
the-board rate revisions was introduced. For 1963—64 a surcharge was levied
on all dutiable articles at a flat rate of 10 percent of the existing import duty.
In addition, a genuine across-the-board "regulatory duty" was levied at 10
percent ad valorem (unless the additional rate figured at 25 percent of the
existing duty worked out higher, in which case this higher rate was ap-
plicable)
Whilethe later budgets continued to raise average tariffs, the only major
change introduced was through the supplementary budget in 1965—66, when
the principle of across-the-board tariffs was further underlined by a major
revision in the tariff rates which aimed at reducing the wide range of selec-
tivity and reducing the rates to a smaller number. The broad structure of the
nominal tariffs that emerged from these changes is reproduced in Table 4—2.
Thus, while import duties were being raised in lieu of the devaluation which
was to come only in 1966, attempts were clearly made to introduce more uni-
formity in the tariff rates. This provided the backdrop to the move toward
a formal rate change and greater unification of the exchange rates for different
activities, which was to begin with the devaluation.
TABLE 4-2
Average Rates of Nominal Import Duty on Broad Classes of





Plant and machinery 35
Agricultural machinery 15
Basic industrial raw materials 40
Processed industrial materials 60
Consumer goods 100
SOURCE: Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic
Affairs, New Delhi.
a. To these rates we must add the regulatory duty of 10 percent.LIBERALIZATION EFFORTS PRIOR TO 1966 79
REMITTANCES SCHEME
The attempt to bring effective exchange rates to more realistic levels had also
been extended to remittances with the National Defense Remittance (NDR)
scheme in October 1965.
In principle, this scheme involved an extension of t:he import entitlement
principle to remittances, so that invisibles were brought within the purview of
subsidization for the first time. Under this scheme, Indian nationals resident
abroad were given import licenses to the value of 60 percent of their remittances
to India. Since these licenses were marketable at a premium, in effect the remit-
tances were being subsidized by the full amount of the price at which the
licenses could be sold. The remittances were to total approximately Rs. 700
million during the period of the operation of the NDR scheme.
We may note, however, that, in consonance with the bureaucratic restric-
tions on entitlements for exports, numerous restrictions were built into this
scheme as well. The NDR import licenses could, in general, be sold only to
producers ("actual users") for certain permissible imports or to general
traders who, in turn, were permitted to import, for resale, only those com-
modities which were specified in Public Notices published from time to time.
Again, the NDR licenses once issued to actual users could not be retrans-
ferred to other actual users. Furthermore, the list of commodities, once opted
for by the actual user in getting his license issued to him against his NDR
purchase, could not be changed even if this change was sought within the
overall list of permissible imports. The bureaucratic nature of such inflexi-
bility, and its economic irrationale, were strikingly highlighted when, with the
introduction of liberal import licensing along with the June 1966 devaluation,
many actual users who had got sulfur specified on their NDR licenses, in view
of its high premium, found sulfur prices tumbling and wished to shift to other
imports. The government eventually permitted this to be done, but again with
considerable reluctance and restrictions: for example, the sulfur licenses could
be converted only into mutton tallow licenses. Bureaucratic notions about
"priority," without any demonstrable rationale, had carried over into the oper-
ation of the NDR scheme as well.
PARTIAL INDUSTRIAL DE-LICENSING
'rhe reader will recall that, in addition to import licensing, the government
also used industrial licensing to regulate the growth of industrial capacity.
'rhe end of our period of analysis in this chapter was to be characterized also
by partial industrial de-licensing, essentially in the form of exemptions of cer-
tain industries from industrial licensing. Thus, in May 1966, eleven industries
were formally de-controlled, including iron and steel castings and structurals
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and cement and pulp. At the same time, the government announced that it
would continue to attempt such de-control in regard to industries which did
not make substantial (direct) demands on the balance of payments through
importation of components and raw materials and which did not encroach
on areas sought to be reserved partially or wholly for the small-scale sector.4
While all the measures which we have reviewed thus far represented sig-
nificant shifts toward liberalization of the unduly rigid economic regime, they
fell short of restructuring the system on the basis of clear and hard analysis.
Nonetheless they did represent significant attempts at loosening up the exist-
ing regime. The June 1966 announcement of the devaluation was, in a sense,
therefore, the culmination of this entire process of reform in the economic
regime of Phase I during Phase 11(1962—66) and can be conceived of as the
initiation of Phase III, aimed at more significant liberalization and rationali-
zation of the trade and payments regime.
NOTES
1. The discussion in this chapter is based on Bhagwati and Desai, India, pp.
468—480.
2. Needless to say, we are aware of the well-known difficulties associated with our
measure of the tariff level (as well as with alternative measures). We do think, however,
that it is an adequate method of underlining the fact that the government increasingly
resorted to tariff increases throughout the period.
3. This regulatory duty came into effect only on February 17, 1965.
4. The momentum toward industrial de-licensing was to be carried beyond June
1966 by further exemptions. At the same time, the government was to ease the scope
and restrictiveness of industrial licensing for the licensed industries by raising the exemp-
tion limit for industrial licensing to units which sought to invest less than Rs. 2.5 million
(with some exceptions). Furthermore, in regard to the licensing requirements for "sub-
stantial expansion" involving expansion by more than 10 percent of the registered ca-
pacity, the government raised this figure generally to 25 percent. Another relaxation, just
after June 1966, related to the diversification of production by units licensed for specific
products. Subject to qualifications (such as the exclusion of products mainly made in
the small-scale sector), 1966 therefore witnessed the grant of permission to diversify
production up to 25 percent of the existing capacity. Note that this measure of liberaliza-
tion also represented a halting and ill-defined move toward a more efficient system. The
decision to stop diversification at 25 percent of the originally licensed capacity was based
on (1) choice of 25 percent without any clear rationale as to the relevant numbers; (2) a
failure to think the problem through and ask why further diversification should not be
permitted; and (3) the consequent inability to see that a system under which full diversi-
fication was automatically permitted except for a small list of priority outputs (whose
production might be required on schedule) and with a small list of prohibited, non-
priority items of manufacture, would have made greater sense, both administratively and
in terms of economic efficiency.